r					
1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SHERMAN DIVISION				
3	WAPP TECHNOLOGY LTD : DOCKET NO. 4:18CV469				
4	VS.	: SHERMAN, TEXAS : APRIL 1, 2020			
5	MICRO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL	: 3:00 P.M.			
6	WAPP TECHNOLOGY LTC	: :			
7	VS.	DOCKET NO. 4:18CV501			
8	WELLS FARGO	· :			
9	WAPP TECHNOLOGY LTD	:			
10	VS.	DOCKET NO. 4:18CV519			
11	BANK OF AMERICA	:			
12	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE				
13	BEFORE THE HONORABLE AMOS L. MAZZANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE				
14	APPEARANCES (BY TELEPHONE):				
15	FOR THE PLAINTIFF:	MR. TIMOTHY DEVLIN			
16		MR. HENRIK PARKER MR. ANDREW DEMARCO			
17		THE DEVLIN LAW FIRM 1526 GILPIN AVENUE			
18		WILMINGTON, DE 19806			
19					
20	FOR THE DEFENDANT:	MR. MARK REITER MS. ASHBEY MORGAN			
21		GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER 2100 MCKINNEY, SUITE 1100			
22		DALLAS, TX 75201			
23		MR. JORDAN BEKIER GIBSON DUNN CRUTCHER			
24		333 S. GRAND, 47TH FLOOR LOS ANGELES, CA 90071			
25					

Case 4:18-cv-00519-ALM Document 70 Filed 04/02/20 Page 2 of 29 PageID #: 2413

				2
1 2	COURT REPORTE	R:	MS. JAN MASON OFFICIAL REPORTER 101 E. PECAN #110	
3			SHERMAN, TEXAS 7	
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16 17				
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23	PROCEEDINGS R	EPORTED BY MECI	HANICAL STENOGRAPHY,	TRANSCRIPT
24	PRODUCED BY C	OMPUTER-AIDED :	TRANSCRIPTION.	
25				

THE COURT: Good afternoon. This is Judge Mazzant. We're here in Case 4:18CV469, 4:18CV501 and 4:18CV519.

Everyone has already made their appearances, and again, as I think my courtroom deputy just indicated, please identify yourself every time you speak, because we are in the courtroom with my court reporter trying to get a good record.

And I believe this call was initiated by the Plaintiff after I think motions to compel were filed and the Court denied those. So if -- whoever is going to speak on behalf of the Plaintiff, if you would like to go ahead and identify yourself and go first and tell me what's going on.

MR. DEVLIN: Your Honor, thank you. This is Tim

Devlin speaking on behalf of Plaintiff. My colleague, Mr.

Parker, will deliver the argument, but I wanted to get on the phone and just acknowledge the error we made in filing this as a written motion originally. I wanted to express to the Court that we take Your Honor's procedures seriously, and my sort of motto is make every mistake just one time. We do have internal procedures to try to prevent that. They obviously did not work, and I've thought about that and we have implemented improvements in those procedures to make sure this doesn't happen again, in this case or any other.

I just wanted to jump on the phone personally and make sure Your Honor was aware of that, that we did take this

```
seriously and were not lightly taking anything about our
1
2
     misstep in filing this as a written motion.
 3
               THE COURT: Mr. Devlin, it's --
               MR. DEVLIN: If Your Honor wants any further
 4
 5
     information on that, I'm happy to offer that. I don't want to
 6
     waste anyone's time.
 7
               THE COURT: No, that's --
8
               MR. DEVLIN: Whatever Your Honor would like.
9
               THE COURT: Mr. Devlin, thank you for the apology.
10
     It's not necessary.
11
          It's a procedure the Court has. I will tell you, it
12
     happens quite often that attorneys file this. And I take no
13
     offense whatsoever. It's just I require more of this
14
     informal procedure, and we resolve about 80 percent of the
     discovery disputes this way, and hopefully I can do it
15
16
     today. But it's nothing to worry about.
17
          Okay. So, Mr. Parker, I understand you're going to
18
     arque.
19
               MR. DEVLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
20
               THE COURT: Go ahead.
21
               MR. PARKER: Thank you, Your Honor. So this is
22
    Henrik Parker.
23
          And Wapp is here today seeking the Court's assistance
24
     in compelling the Defendants in all of the three actions.
25
     The positions taken, I believe, by the Defendants across all
```

three actions are identical with respect to this issue, so it applies across the board, and our arguments apply across the board as well.

And we are seeking to -- the Court's assistance to compel the Defendants to comply with their discovery obligations with respect to the scope of products as to which they provide responsive discovery information.

Wapp has reasonably sought information going to various Defendants' products and systems that embody various aspects of the asserted claims. And while we think that the Defendants are actually obligated to provide that information even without our specifically asking for it, we have asked for it in various fashions, and the Defendants have unilaterally and consistently refused to provide any discovery as to any product other than three specific product systems that were included in Wapp's original infringement contentions.

So, in essence, they're refusing to give us anything that goes to any product that wasn't specifically and originally accused of infringement, and that has taken place in document production, interrogatory responses, mandatory disclosures, source code production and even Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notices.

We believe that this is contrary to law, and I'll get into that in a second, but perhaps I should be a little more

specific here about what it is we've asked for that they haven't been giving us.

In our first set of interrogatories we set out a specific definition of a term that we use, accused instrumentality, and perhaps that term was a little aggressive. It could have been any term. It could have just been relevant systems or something.

But in any event, the definition included -- and I'll quote a little bit here -- all products, systems or methods that have been purchased, used, made or developed by or for Defendants that are capable of or advertised or marketed as being capable of. And then we go on and describe various acts of the kinds that are specifically covered in the claims of the asserted patent steps. So the definition clearly is looking for stuff that relates to products that may embody the patented claims.

We use that term then to seek various types of information in the interrogatories, you know, about design, function, operation of products, about the role played by various entities in making and selling those, and, you know, financial information and sales channels about them.

In response to those interrogatories, the Defendants asserted an objection, general Objection No. 12, alleging initially generically that the definition was overly broad and burdensome, but then when they got specific, stating

that the Defendants were going to interpret the defined term as referring only to three specific systems, systems that the Defendants alleged were the only ones that, according to them, we had purported to provide a chart identifying specifically where each element was found within each identified product, which according to them, was as required by the Local Patent Rules. So, in other words, they were refusing to provide any discovery on any product beyond those that were in our original infringement contentions.

Since the time of receiving those objections, they've continually asserted that over all these other areas, and I could certainly go through those but I don't know that we need to at this point because the crux of the issue here is really the overarching objection. And once that's resolved, I think both parties or all parties will be able to apply it appropriately.

I will point out, however, that during various meet and confer communications, and in particular, in a couple of letters that I sent to opposing counsel on February 5th and 13th, we provided more extensive, specific lists of product systems that we felt fell within that definition that I read to you earlier and the kind of discovery that we believe we were entitled to and that they had an obligation to give us.

Notably, the Defendants have never contended that our definition was -- the list of products that we provided,

that that was not reasonably related to the elements of the asserted claims. There's really no dispute about the scope being reasonable. It's only about whether or not they have to do anything beyond the specific products in our infringement contentions, our original infringement contentions.

So Wapp believes that this is legally improper because it's well-established in this district, as in probably most, if not all districts, that as stated in epicRealm Licensing versus Autoflex Leasing, a case from this district in 2007, relevant discovery in a patent infringement suit includes discovery relating to the technical operation of the accused products as well as the identity of the technical operation of any products reasonably similar to any accused products.

There are a bunch of cases that are to the same effect, and we can certainly provide those if you desire.

In that case, I think it was Judge Folsom, in ruling that the scope of discovery wasn't limited to products identified in the infringement contentions but also included reasonably similar ones, the Judge said that this finding best comports with the notice pleading and broad discovery regime created by the Federal Rules and the right to develop new information in discovery.

So this is the crux of the issue. We think we're entitled to discovery of products that are reasonably

similar to the accused products, but the Defendants have a contrary view.

The definition was specifically tailored to encompass not only the specifically identified ones but products that were reasonably similar. Defendants don't deny that.

The Defendants have access to their own products, which we don't have full access to. I'll talk about that in a moment. But certainly for them to determine which products fit within this definition should not be a particular hardship or burden for them.

And it's no different than any other ongoing obligation that a defendant or a party has in any litigation, to make reasonable decisions about what information is related to the action and should be produced without being — any need to be specifically asked for by the other side. So we think the Defendants should be compelled to do that here.

In our meet and confers, the Defendants have contended that we have to do more to get the information and that we have to somehow meet what they describe as a four-part test that they parsed from another case in this district,

Honeywell International versus Acer America, which according to the Defendants they believe we have to show, one, that the information sought is not publicly available; two, that our infringement contentions gave the Defendant notice of a specific theory of infringement; three, that the products we

seek discovery about operate in a manner that's reasonably similar to that theory; and four, that we've been diligent in seeking the information.

It's not entirely clear to us that this test is mandatory or -- or controlling here. Even if it is, we don't think there's really any legitimate dispute that we've met the standards.

As to the first factor, many — these are not the kind of products that you can just go into your local Best Buy or Apple store or something and grab one off of the shelf.

They are sophisticated systems that are set up on servers and accessed remotely. And it is not something that we can readily make the determination as to the breadth of products or to fully analyze such products.

During the meet and confers, Defendants have implied that at least some of the products have free demo versions available on-line, and while that may be true to a certain extent, clearly there are many products that -- for which no such free demos are available. And even, while we have specifically asked them, they have been unwilling to confirm for us that any such free demo actually is complete and robust enough that it encompasses or evidences the full complexity of these products, such that we could make use of those to entirely determine one way or the other whether something infringes or -- or prove our case if it did

infringe. So it's just not feasible to say that we should be able to get all these and make all these determinations on our own.

The second factor is the theory of infringement, which we believe we've done a very detailed job in our -- particularly our updated infringement contentions. There are more than 150 pages of claim charts. And so I -- I don't feel like there's any need to go into that further at the moment.

The third factor is whether we're seeking stuff that's reasonably similar, and certainly it has been our full intent that what we are seeking is reasonably similar. That was the idea behind the definition and tying it to claim elements, so that we -- we don't have any interest in getting information about stuff that's not going to be relevant to this lawsuit, so I don't think there should be any real dispute about that.

Then the final factor is whether we diligently sought the information from the Defendants or -- and certainly, we've been trying to get it. We -- we have asked them multiple times. And as in the Honeywell case where it was found that under similar facts, we've made sufficient efforts to give them notice of our theories and what we're after, and certainly we've come to the Court at a fairly early stage in the discovery process.

So even if the four-part test applies, we feel like we've met it. The Defendants have refused at every turn and on multiple different contexts to provide this properly requested information, and we're seeking the Court's assistance to strike down Objection No. 12 and order that the Defendants immediately provide all the requested discovery for the full scope of products and systems that we set forth in our definition, a definition that we feel essentially just puts to words the scope of Defendants' inherent discovery obligations that they should be providing even without being asked.

So that's what I have for the moment, Your Honor.

Obviously, I'll wait to hear what the other side has to say.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Response?

MR. REITER: Yes. Good afternoon, Your Honor. This is Mark Reiter for the Defendants.

So to begin with, I -- with respect to my colleague on the other side, I disagree with almost, I think, everything that he said.

First of all, the law in this district, as Your Honor is well aware, does not have a bright line rule as Plaintiff is trying to say for discovery related to products that are not identified in the infringement contentions, and that's what we're talking about here is Plaintiff is asking, and we

believe literally is going on a fishing expedition, for any products that might infringe.

You heard Mr. Parker say that they were just seeking information about relevant systems, and that's very, very broad. And he talked about and said systems that may embody the asserted claims. That, again, is very, very broad.

What happened in epicRealm -- and I know Your Honor is aware of this because in the Imperium decision that you issued some years ago, I think 2012, you went through these factors and you recognized what Judge Folsom said.

Judge Folsom said that the Court finds there is no bright line rule that discovery can be obtained if related to an accused product identified in the parties' infringement contentions.

What Plaintiffs are trying to do here is set a bright line rule that as long as it's reasonably similar or we say all we want are things that are reasonably similar, we get it. But that's not what Judge Folsom said either. Judge Folsom said in epicRealm, the Court concludes that the scope of discovery may, may include products and services that are reasonably similar to those accused in the infringement contentions.

And since Judge Folsom's decision, courts in this district, including yourself, have applied what that may factor is by putting together a four-factor test. It's not

that it may or may not apply that four-factor test, as Mr.

Parker said. It's quite clear that that four-factor test is the test, consistent with what Judge Folsom said in whether

a party, a plaintiff may additionally get discovery into

products that are not identified in the contentions.

And those factors, Mr. Parker -- I do agree with him as to what those factors are. Is the information publicly available? Has Plaintiff identified a cognizable infringement theory? Are the products that are -- that discovery is being sought for reasonably similar in theory to the products for which a theory has been stated? And was the Plaintiff diligent?

Here Wapp has satisfied none of those factors. You haven't seen a shred of evidence, there's no declaration, no evidence at all from Wapp as to the efforts it went to to try and demonstrate what information is available or not, what its theories are.

And with respect to its theories, we do take issue that Wapp has properly identified theories. We filed on December 23rd -- we had a very brief telephone conversation with Your Honor about this back in December. We filed a motion to strike their contentions because they identified no cognizable, no understandable theory. So we take issue with whether they've done that.

There is no evidence here, even assuming they have

identified a theory, that the products for which they seek discovery operate in a way similar to those for which they charted, the third factor.

And four, there has been no diligence here.

And let me turn back to the point that Mr. Parker said about the scope of their definition. Your Honor held in the Imperium case, or recognized, I should say, in the Imperium case that in the Honeywell case decided by Judge Love following these four factors, the Court held that the Plaintiff was, quote, not entitled to discovery of all of Defendants' LCD products — those were the products that were accused there — merely because the patent—in—suit relates to LCD systems.

What Wapp has said by talking about may embody the claims, relevant systems, is they are seeking discovery of anything that might relate to the technology that's claimed in the three asserted patents, and that was explicitly denied in Honeywell, and Your Honor recognized that.

So with respect to publicly available information, despite the fact that we believe that their contentions, even as supplemented, are deficient, Plaintiff was nonetheless able to find publicly available information about the products that they did chart. They were able to use that. They didn't need to have and they didn't rely on operational or working versions, whether test or otherwise,

of the products to prepare the charts that they did prepare, to identify the products that they did identify and chart.

They don't meet that here.

But putting that aside, there's reams of information about all of the products that are sold by Micro Focus. We have a declaration that we're ready to submit to Your Honor that's almost 40 pages long from Mr. Roboostoff, who is Micro Focus's functional and performance portfolio director, that explains page after page and picture after picture of information that is available about the accused products — not the accused products. The products that were sold by the Defendants.

That includes manuals, not of just the current versions of the products, but versions going back several years.

There are Help Centers where a party can put in any topic about a product or potentially about a product and get help and get information about that.

There are training videos. Micro Focus has a YouTube channel, their own YouTube channel that has dozens of videos about how these products operate. There are white papers. There are many, many, many hundreds, if not thousands, of pages on each product available.

Plaintiff has done nothing. You have no declaration, no explanation of anything that they have done to try and find this information. So they failed at the outset on the

first -- the first prong, whether or not the information was publicly available or not. Here the information was.

And as you found in Imperium, you denied the Plaintiff's motion to compel because you said Plaintiff must, as an initial matter, demonstrate that the information it seeks is not publicly available and that it has not been diligent in seeking such information. You said the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet this threshold. Plaintiff fails to identify any efforts it took to investigate the non-accused products. Moreover, there is no evidence offered to demonstrate Plaintiff's use of the publicly available information.

The same could not be more true here. We have seen nothing from the Plaintiff to identify any efforts it took to investigate the non-accused products, and there's no evidence that's offered by Wapp to demonstrate that it tried or it used any of the publicly available information. It has done nothing.

With respect to the second factor, as I said, in the Honeywell case, Judge Love found that a cognizable theory of infringement had been identified. The defendant in that case said that they contested that and Judge Love said, well, you didn't say anything soon enough.

We made our motion within three weeks of receiving their supplemental contentions. We filed that on

December 23rd. We received their supplemental contentions, I believe, on December 2nd or 3rd.

With respect to a showing of whether the products are reasonably similar, again, this is the publicly available information. Nothing.

In Honeywell -- in Honeywell, what the Plaintiff did there is element by element it explained why the products that it had identified were expected to be reasonably similar to those for which it sought discovery. We have nothing like that here.

Finally, with respect to diligence, given the reams of information that is available -- and it is just volumes, Your Honor. As I said, manuals, Help Centers, YouTube channels, white papers and so forth. The Plaintiff has shown nothing. It hasn't even tried to download that information.

We didn't hear Mr. Parker say that they had downloaded some of the products that were available and it just wasn't sufficient. He just said it's not all there and these are sophisticated products that you can't get at Best Buy.

Finally, Your Honor, with respect to the contentions, again, we do believe that there has not been a showing. We disagree strenuously with what Mr. Parker said, that we do not dispute that what they are seeking are reasonably related.

We don't understand what their theories are. We haven't seen why or how they believe that these products for which they are seeking discovery matter. We don't understand even what some of these products are. And in some of the definitions they identify something called AWS. We don't know what that is. Perhaps it's Amazon Web Services, but this isn't -- we're not Amazon. I don't know what AWS is. It's not a product of ours. That's the only acronym I know AWS is for.

So with all due respect, Your Honor, we believe that their motion should be denied. We believe they have failed to show what they need to show, and they have failed to comply with the rules of this district, which they have very strenuously asked to partake in, having opposed our motion to transfer, and we should move forward on the products that they identified.

They had almost 18 months from the filing of the complaint until things got sorted out before they did their contentions. They had plenty of time. They did nothing.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Any response, Mr. Parker?

MR. PARKER: Yes, Your Honor, a few things.

First, as to the definition that was in our discovery request and the -- maybe I should give you one or two examples. The definition says that we're looking for

products or systems that are capable of, for example, simulating mobile networks from any geographic location world-wide for mobile application testing; providing a library of real world mobile and broadband network conditions. These are — these are elements that are essentially directly from the claims that are being asserted in this action.

So it's not like we're simply asking for any application that they have. We — we have tried to tailor it to the issues that will be in this litigation. And I guess Mr. Reiter is now objecting to that definition, but they had never previously stated that they had any problems with the language of the definition, other than just the generic it's over-broad, which was followed up by their we're going to limit it to three specific things. So I think it's a little disingenuous to be now starting to argue about that.

Secondly, I just — counsel referred to your Imperium decision several times and I — I did want to point out in the Imperium Holdings decision that that action involved physical items that could be purchased and disassembled, which is quite a different scenario than what we've got here where we're dealing with highly complex software, much of the underlying software and certainly the source code of which is unavailable to Wapp.

Also, in that case the crux of the issue ended up being was the other -- the discovery sought going to products that were reasonably similar, and as I just discussed, I don't believe that there was a debate before this phone call about whether or not what we were seeking is stuff that's reasonably similar.

So they were asking in Imperium Holdings about discovery of any, you know, image sensors or image processors, which is a fairly broad and generic term that really doesn't tie to — to asserted claims particularly, which is not like the way that we did with our definition.

So -- and, finally, I guess I would note that in that opinion, Your Honor at the conclusion of it specifically said that, you know, despite the fact that you were denying that motion to compel there, you pointed out that the defendants were still under a continuous obligation to produce discovery of any products that are, quote, reasonably similar.

So that's all we're looking for here, and really, I think there's something of a question of reasonableness here, both in the effort and the substance. The idea that we can access -- you know, again, we asked the other side would they -- would they confirm for us that what they are alleging are free versions actually would be sufficient for purposes of the issues of this case, that if we took some

free version, would we be able to, you know, to rely on the fact that whatever it showed to us or didn't show to us was sufficient for meeting the issues of this case, and they have declined to give us that assurance.

And so -- and as far as we can tell, we did do a -- a search a few days ago trying to figure out whether there were free versions of the lists of products that we gave to them that we thought were within the scope of our definition, and I believe that well over half of them can't be found. Whether or not the ones that can be found are sufficient or not, there's a whole bunch that aren't found.

So, really, this seems like an attempt by the Defendants to -- to hide the ball on us in a scenario where they should be able to readily provide us with the information. They should be readily able to provide us with, for example, an operating version of a system that we can analyze.

And just today they actually said they would give us operable versions of the three systems that they have agreed they would produce, and there's just no particular reason why they shouldn't be able to do it similarly for these other products.

I think I will stop now, unless Your Honor has questions.

MR. REITER: Your Honor, if I could just respond

briefly. This is Mark Reiter again.

THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.

MR. REITER: I think there's a more fundamental question here, Your Honor, than whether there are working versions available or not. The more fundamental question is, did the Plaintiff comply with its obligation under the Local Patent Rules and identify the products that it should have identified in its contentions. They didn't. That is the fundamental question here.

It is their -- it is reams of publicly available information about the products. They didn't have the working versions of the products they charted. They were able to, nonetheless, chart them, we think deficiently, but they, nonetheless, identified them sufficiently such that we're not challenging whether those products are reasonably in the case.

The problem here is they didn't do their homework.

They didn't do their work. Now they're trying to shift the burden to us to try to figure things out.

You heard Mr. Parker again say we tried in our definition to summarize the claim elements. Well, that, again, is violative of what Judge Love said and you recognized -- what Judge Love said in Honeywell and what you recognized in Imperium that Plaintiff is not entitled to discovery of all things that might be relevant to the

patent. That's what they're trying to do here. It is not our burden to do that. Particularly, again, when there is so much information.

And you didn't hear — other than the statement that a couple of days ago or a few days ago they tried to download a product or two, you didn't hear anything about any searching on the Micro Focus website. You didn't hear anything about information that was lacking for the purposes of being able, in the first instance, in the infringement contentions to identify these products.

What was lacking from the manual? What was lacking from the Help Center? What was lacking from the YouTube training videos, from the white papers? You didn't hear any statement that they ever tried to look for that information, and now they're trying to shift the burden to us and say just give us everything. You guys go figure it out and give us everything. We haven't shown that it's not publicly available. We haven't shown you anything that we've done.

In fact, Your Honor, in early December we made the source code available pursuant to Rule 3-1(g) for the products that they identified. To this day -- and I understand that today things are a little bit different in the world. But to this day, there has been no effort on the part of Plaintiffs to go inspect that source code, no effort at all, none.

So they have not done what they need to do, and they're now trying to put the burden back on us, despite the fact that they didn't chart them, despite the fact that they didn't identify these products, despite the fact that they're going on a fishing expedition. They haven't identified a theory. They haven't identified how these products might be relevant for the theory they allege they have identified, and they haven't been diligent.

And with respect to that last sentence in Imperium, what I believe that goes to — and I certainly don't want to be interpreting your language to you. But what I believe that sentence went to was in a part of the case the parties agreed that certain products were reasonably similar and the defendant was producing that, and my understanding of that last sentence was with respect to the products for which there was no dispute over reasonable similarity, the defendant had an ongoing obligation. But with respect to the products that were at issue in the motion where plaintiff had not shown that it had been diligent, where plaintiff had not shown that there was a lack of publicly available information, that sentence didn't apply.

And I'm happy to answer any questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Anything else?
MR. PARKER: Your Honor, just one point or a

25 | combination point.

Counsel for Defendant seems to be trying to say that we are not entitled to anything unless we have put it into infringement contentions, and the case law is very clear that we're not strictly limited to that, that there are other things that are appropriately discoverable.

And, indeed, I think it's Defendants that are trying to shift the burden here. We gave them, during the meet and confer process, a very specific list of products that we thought met -- fell within our definition, and they haven't denied that those products fall within our definition.

They're just saying we're not going to do anything for you.

MR. REITER: Your Honor, again, Mark Reiter. If they were able to identify those products, why didn't they chart the products? Why didn't they put them in their contentions? They didn't. And now to come in and try and fill in the gap without satisfying the requirements that were laid out in Imperium and in Honeywell.

And Judge Folsom certainly did not, as I've already said and as you recognized, there was no -- no bottom line rule that they get this discovery. They may, if they show and satisfy the elements.

As I said, Your Honor, and I'll offer this to the Court

if it would be helpful, we have that declaration ready to go to demonstrate the public -- just the volume of publicly available information and a short five page response to what it is that they filed. It's just five pages, along with that declaration, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And let me tell you, after hearing everyone's arguments, here's what I'm going to do. I have not studied the actual motion to compel. We just kind of denied it summarily, and my clerks do that kind of routinely. So because there was not a response, I did not examine it. After hearing the arguments, I now want to read it, so I will give the defense the opportunity to file a response and then -- and it can be a normal response. I'm not limiting you to -- the limits are only under the Local Rules. The question is, can you do that in like seven days?

MR. REITER: I -- I can do that today, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And then the Plaintiff, if you want to file a reply, you can do that within seven days, as soon as they file their response. And then I'll take care of it pretty quickly.

I just want to read it, and it's not fair for me to read this without giving them a chance to respond to what's written. I just can't make a decision -- I need to study it. I just can't make a decision based on what you said. But I will resolve it pretty quickly.

```
Okay. Anything else I can do for the Plaintiff today?
1
 2
               MR. PARKER: No, Your Honor.
 3
               THE COURT: Anything from defense in addition?
               MR. REITER: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
 4
 5
               THE COURT: Okay. They said they would file that
 6
            Again, is seven days -- let me just ask, is the
7
     Plaintiff going to file a reply?
8
               MR. PARKER: Your Honor, I think we definitely will,
9
     and actually that does raise a point. The other -- the
10
     Defendants' opening claim construction brief is due today, and
11
     so our reply to that is also due seven days from now.
12
     either -- I would appreciate to either hold off on filing their
13
     opposition to this motion to compel for a couple of days or
14
     that we be given at least a couple of days more than seven so
15
     that we don't have both of those due on the same day.
16
               THE COURT: So, Mr. Reiter, why don't you -- I was
17
     going to give you seven days to file the response. Do you want
18
     to go ahead and take them up on that and then -- just to
19
     stretch it out so that all those things aren't due at the same
20
    time?
21
               MR. REITER: Sure, sure. I appreciate it, Your
22
     Honor. We'll file -- it may be sooner than seven days but --
23
               THE COURT: No, that's fine.
24
               MR. REITER: But we won't file it today so that Mr.
25
     Parker can get his claim construction reply brief done.
```

```
29
1
               THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Parker, once they file it,
2
     you have seven days to file the reply and I think that should
 3
     solve the problem.
               MR. PARKER: Sure. Thank you, Your Honor.
 4
 5
               THE COURT: Okay. Y'all have a great day and stay
 6
     safe.
           Thank you.
7
               MR. REITER: Thank you, Your Honor.
8
               MR. PARKER: Thank you, Your Honor.
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
     I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
20
     the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
21
22
     Jan Mason
                                      Date
23
24
25
```